UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said on 10 September that the master of a vessel had reported seeing four unknown projectiles strike two vessels about four nautical miles west of Khasab, Oman. One of the vessels was reported to be on fire, while the condition of the second was initially unclear. UKMTO said authorities were investigating and advised vessels in the area to transit with caution.
The warning followed another UKMTO report a day earlier involving a tanker approximately 28 nautical miles south-east of Al-Faw, Iraq, whose master reported the vessel had been struck by an unknown projectile. The crew was reported safe and no environmental impact had been identified at the time of the notice. Taken together, the incidents underline the extent to which the wider Gulf security environment has become a live operational issue for commercial shipping rather than a remote geopolitical risk.
The latest attack report was also picked up by Reuters on 13 September, which described renewed concern over the vulnerability of oil flows through the Strait. The waterway has long been one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, and the continuing uncertainty has become increasingly significant not only for crude supply but for vessel availability, freight pricing and the willingness of owners to accept Gulf exposure.
Security risk is now showing up directly in voyage economics
The commercial impact is already visible in insurance costs. Reuters reported on 9 September that Paul Bradshaw, a director at Emirates National Oil Company, said war-risk and cargo-insurance costs for Hormuz transits had risen sharply after the regional conflict. According to the report, cargo insurance alone could represent up to 6% of cargo value in some cases, while war-risk premiums that had previously been negligible were said to have risen to as much as 10% of cargo value.
Bradshaw said the combined additional cost of a transit could reach between US$10 million and US$20 million. Whether those figures apply to a particular voyage will depend on vessel type, cargo, insurer, routing and the security position at the relevant time, but the direction of travel is clear: security risk is no longer simply an operational issue to be considered by the master and managers. It is becoming a major voyage-cost item that can materially alter the economics of a charter.
That change matters because many shipping contracts allocate additional premiums, deviation costs and delay differently. An owner may consider a voyage unsafe or commercially unacceptable at the same time that a charterer expects performance. The legal answer will depend on the wording actually incorporated into the charterparty, including any war-risk clause, liberty provision, safe-port undertaking, cancellation right and bespoke rider dealing with the Gulf or the Middle East.
War-risk clauses will be tested against fast-moving facts
For voyage and time charterparties, the most immediate contractual question is usually whether the agreed war-risk wording permits the owner or master to refuse, delay or alter performance. That question is highly fact-sensitive. The existence of regional hostilities does not automatically answer whether a particular port, route or area meets the contractual threshold for refusal, and the wording of older war-risk clauses can differ materially from newer forms.
Owners considering non-performance will therefore need to build a contemporaneous record showing the information on which the decision was based: security advisories, insurer positions, routing assessments, flag-state or naval guidance, the vessel’s characteristics and any specific threats relevant to the intended voyage. Charterers, meanwhile, will want to know whether the contractual preconditions for refusal have actually been met and whether an alternative route, port or nomination remains available.
Insurance is part of the same picture but should not be treated as interchangeable with the contractual analysis. A higher additional premium does not by itself establish that a voyage may be refused, just as an insurer’s willingness to continue cover does not necessarily mean that the voyage must be performed. The operational, insurance and contractual questions overlap, but each has its own legal test.
Sanctions risk sits alongside, rather than inside, the safety analysis
The current Gulf environment also means that sanctions and trade restrictions cannot be separated completely from navigational planning. That problem has become more acute as Iran’s PGSA blacklist and related US sanctions exposure add a separate layer of counterparty and transit risk. Communications with local authorities or designated entities, payment of fees, access to services and arrangements for security or safe passage can therefore create sanctions issues even where the underlying purpose is operational safety.
That makes it important for companies to distinguish between a master’s immediate safety communication and wider commercial engagement. Where unusual payments, service arrangements or contacts with sanctioned parties are proposed, legal and sanctions teams should be brought into the decision-making process early rather than after the operational arrangement has already been made.
The same caution applies to attribution. UKMTO’s notices describe reported incidents and state when authorities are investigating; they do not necessarily identify who carried out an attack. Contractual notices, public statements and internal assessments should therefore avoid treating responsibility as established unless supported by reliable official information.
What shipping companies should be watching now
The security picture is moving quickly enough that a voyage decision made one week may not be defensible on the same basis the next. Owners and managers should continue to monitor UKMTO incident reporting, naval and flag-state guidance and any changes in insurer requirements. Chartering teams should track how additional premiums and longer routing are being allocated commercially, while legal teams should review the war-risk language in active fixtures rather than relying on generic assumptions about what the clause permits.
Regional diplomacy will also remain relevant. Reuters reported that discussions involving Iran, Oman and Gulf states were continuing over access to the Strait, but that no immediate signed arrangement was expected. Until the political and security position becomes more predictable, the practical reality for shipping is likely to remain one of heightened cost, tighter risk controls and more frequent contractual disputes over whether and how voyages should proceed.
Sources
- UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), Recent Incidents, including Warning #133 dated 10 September 2026 and Warning #131 dated 9 September 2026.
- Reuters, “New report of attack on Strait of Hormuz shipping fans fears of threats to oil supplies”, 13 September 2026.
- Reuters, “Oil vessel transit costs through Hormuz escalated after Iran war, ENOC exec says”, 9 September 2026.
- Reuters, “No signed Hormuz deal expected yet from Oman meeting on Monday, Iranian official says”, 12 September 2026.
Source note: Maritime Legal Business prepared this article from the public sources identified above and has not independently verified the underlying incidents. References to contractual consequences are general observations only; the position on any voyage depends on the applicable contract and facts. This article does not constitute legal advice.